Resilience Analytics and Economic Modeling

Igor Linkov, PhD
US Army Engineer Research and Development Center and FEMA Region 1
Igor.Linkov@usace.army.mil

US Army Corps of Engineers

ERDC ENGINEER RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT CENTER

DISCOVER | DEVELOP | DELIVER

About Army Engineer R&D Center



Risk and Decision Science Team Boston, MA

7 Laboratories

Coastal and Hydraulics Laboratory (CHL)
Cold Regions Research and Engineering Laboratory (CRREL)
Construction Engineering Research Laboratory (CERL)
Environmental Laboratory (EL)
Geospatial Research Laboratory (GRL
Geotechnical and Structures Laboratory (GSL)
Information Technology Laboratory (ITL)

Annual Research Program Exceeding $1.3 Billion

People

2100 Strong
61% E&S
71% of E&S with Advanced Degrees
29% of E&S with PhD

Core Competencies

- Blast and Weapons Effects on Structures and Geo-Materials
- 3-D Mapping and Characterization
- Cold Regions Science and Engineering
- Civil and Military Engineering
- Computational Prototyping of Military Platforms
- Coastal, River, and Environmental Engineering
- Military Installations and Infrastructure

Partners

All DoD Services
Army, Navy, Air Force, NASA, DHS, FEMA, DIA, NGA
Academia
68 EPAs with top engineering schools
Industry
172 CRADAs
International
14 international agreements with 7 countries

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FEMA/ASPR Reg. 1 Data Analytics Section



- The Section is co-led by the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and the Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), and includes personnel from the United States Army Corps of Engineers (UASCE)
- The FEMA/ASPR Region 1 Data Analytics Section was established to support the Regional Response Coordination Center (RRCC) COVID-19 response efforts
- The Section provides modeling and analysis to support and inform decisionmakers on the distribution of resources, fatality management, the Reopening of America efforts, and second wave scenarios

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Productivity Paradox: Euro Area total factor productivity



Source: Bergeaud *et al* (2016), database updated in 2019 available at http://www.longtermproductivity.com/.

Post-COVID Productivity indicators for the state of Maine



Consumer Spending:
Back to "normal"

40% of small businesses are closed

Outline

Team: USACE/FEMA/HHS – science of resilience, framing the problem, application to COVID in FEMA Region 1 and worldwide.

Complex Systems and Resilience: efficiency vs. resilience

Science of Resilience: Historical perspectives (Venice), resilience quantification using metrics-based (Resilience Matrix) and model-based (Network Science) approaches.

Application Example – Financial Implication of Lack of Resilience

Conclusion: Resilience based approaches and economic analyses need to be integrated to assure both efficiency and resilience in operation of complex systems that communities rely on

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Economic Systems are Global



vaccine production Dependent on many components and connections that may be failing

Quality chemical agents

Quality biological agents

Bioreactors, microcarriers, serums, etc.



Are these likely points of failure and if so, how will vaccine manufacture persevere to meet vaccination targets?

From the Factory to the Frontlines
The Operation Warp Speed Strategy for Distributing a COVID-19 Vaccine

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How to Enhance supply chain productivity and efficiency and be resilient?



Even small changes to build resilience have a cost, so organizational leaders should make decisions following detailed cost/benefit analysis. Determining the right level of investment requires understanding how vulnerable the organization is and identifying where opportunities for improvement exist.

nature

CORRESPONDENCE · 08 DECEMBER 2020

Combine resilience and efficiency in post-COVID societies

Benjamin D. Trump, Igor Linkov & William Hynes

ions/hda-role-of-distributors-in-the-us-health-care-industry.ashx

Deloitte.

HDA RESEARCH FOUNDATION

The First 90 Days:
US Biopharmaceutical Finished Goods
Supply Chain Response to COVID-19

Vision for system modeling

Real World



Model



Operations

Management Alternatives

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

What Makes Complex Systems (Communities) Susceptible to Threat?



After Linkov and Trump, 2019

Pandemics Before: Plague



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Plague in Europe

- In 1347 Italian merchants fled the plague-infected Black Sea ports and unwittingly spread the disease to the Mediterranean Basin

By 1348, following trade routes, plague had sparked epidemics in most of western Europe

Victims developed inflamed lymph nodes, most died within a few days of onset of symptoms

Significant population decline, “Black Death”



Plague Risk Assessment & Management

(Venice, 1348)

Threat: God

Threat: Skin

Threat: Vampire

Management: Brick in Mouth

Management: Metals

Management: Praying

Moving Towards Resilience



Trump, B., et al (2020). Biosecurity Demands Resilience. *Environmental Science & Technology,* **54,** 4706−4708

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Measuring Resilience in Different Systems



After



After Linkov and Kott, 2019

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Resilience Matrix



Scale

Home | Neighborhood | Town | County | Region | State | Country

After Linkov et al. (2013)

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Assessment using Decision Maker Values



Figure 5: Comparative Assessment of Resilience-Enhancing Alternatives

Use developed resilience metrics to comparatively assess the costs and benefits of different courses of action

After Fox-Lent et al. (2015)

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RESILINC – example of metric-based approach

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Network-based Resilience Theory?

System's *critical functionality* (K)

Network topology: *nodes* ($\mathcal{N}$) and *links* ($\mathcal{L}$)

Network *adaptive algorithms* ($\mathcal{C}$) defining how nodes' (links') properties and parameters change with time

A *set of possible damages* stakeholders want the network to be resilient against ($\boldsymbol{E}$)



After Ganin et al., 2016

$$R = f(\mathcal{N}, \mathcal{L}, \mathcal{C}, \boldsymbol{E})$$

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Poor Efficiency:

System cannot not accommodate a large volume of commuters driving at the same time.

Traffic congestions are predictable and are typically of moderate level.



Lack of Resilience:

System cannot recover from adverse events
(car accidents, natural disasters)

Traffic disruptions are not predictable and of variable scale.



Scenario 1
"Baseline"

Random Network Disruptions

Scenario 2

Resilience Model

Interested in:

1. Temporal Patterns of Disruptions
2. Compare Multiple Cities

Transportation Network Model:



1) Build networks comprise of road links and intersection nodes
2) Assign travelers and routes
3) Calculate free flow travel times and actual travel times
4) Calculate normal delay
5) Calibrate model to data

$$\langle \Delta T \rangle = \frac{1}{N_c} \sum_{\{ij\} \in \text{all roads}} L_{ij} \ell_{ij} \left(\frac{1}{v_{ij}} - \frac{1}{v_{ij}^0} \right)$$



Transportation Networks in 40 Cities

SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

NETWORK SCIENCE

Resilience and efficiency in transportation networks

Alexander A. Ganin,[1,2] Maksim Kitsak,[3] Dayton Marchese,[2] Jeffrey M. Keisler,[4] Thomas Seager,[5] Igor Linkov[2]*



Temporal Pattern of Recovery) (5% disruption)



Resilience vs Efficiency at 5% disruption



SCIENCE ADVANCES | RESEARCH ARTICLE

NETWORK SCIENCE 2017

Resilience and efficiency in transportation networks

Alexander A. Ganin,[1,2] Maksim Kitsak,[3] Dayton Marchese,[2] Jeffrey M. Keisler,[4] Thomas Seager,[5] Igor Linkov[2]*

Impact of Cyber Attack on Transportation Network



Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

2019

Transportation Research Part C

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/trc

Resilience in Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS)

Alexander A. Ganin[a,b], Avi C. Mersky[a], Andrew S. Jin[c], Maksim Kitsak[d], Jeffrey M. Keisler[e], Igor Linkov[a,*]

Increase in Transportation Costs

		Fraction of Affected Roadways (Network Links), ρ				
		1%	2%	3%	4%	5%
Transportation Cost Increase, $c(\rho)$	Atlanta	4%	10%	16%	23%	**33%**
	Detroit	3%	6%	9%	14%	19%
	Houston	5%	11%	16%	24%	**32%**
	Jacksonville	7%	13%	22%	**33%**	**44%**
	Los Angeles	1%	3%	5%	7%	9%
	Miami	4%	9%	13%	18%	23%
	Orlando	4%	9%	14%	20%	**26%**
	San Francisco	9%	20%	**34%**	**43%**	**51%**
	Seattle	3%	6%	9%	13%	17%
	Tampa	6%	12%	20%	**26%**	**37%**

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Transportation Research Part D

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/trd

Lack of resilience in transportation networks: Economic implications

Impact on GDP



Resilience in Big Cities

Resilience



GDP

After Kurth et al., 2020

Resilience in "Rich" Cities

Resilience



GDP Per Capita

After Kurth et al., 2020

Managing Resilience is Different than Efficiency



Efficiency

- the ability to move quickly when the network is functioning as designed
- cost effectively improved by increasing capacity on existing and highly utilized right of ways

Resilience

- the ability to limit delays from network component failures
- best improved by provide alternative route capacity when failure does occur

Resilience and Epidemic Spread

The resilience is defined as a competition process between commuters and disease spreading in a metapopulation system.



Three Behavioral Disease models

1. Local Information
2. Global Information
3. Local, belief-based spread of the fear of the disease

After Massaro et al., 2018

SCIENTIFIC REPORTS

OPEN

Resilience management during large-scale epidemic outbreaks

Emanuele Massaro[1,2,3], Alexander Ganin[1,4], Nicola Perra[5,6,7], Igor Linkov[1] & Alessandro Vespignani[6,7,8]

Received: 26 September 2017
Accepted: 5 January 2018
Published online: 30 January 2018

Assessing and managing the impact of large-scale epidemics considering only the individual risk and severity of the disease is exceedingly difficult and could be extremely expensive. Economic consequences, infrastructure and service disruption, as well as the recovery speed, are just a few of the

Resilience, Risk and Travel Restrictions







From Massaro, Linkov et al (2018)

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Supporting FEMA Region 1:

Translate State-specific COVID-19 and socio-political realities into an actionable plan consistent with federal guidelines.



- There will be future public health challenges related to secondary waves
- Modeling and analytical tools should continue to be developed



How Can This Be Achieved?

- Modeling Epidemics in New England
- New England Health and Institutional Requirements
- Modeling Recovery and 2nd Wave



ERDC SEIR Model



- Adapted SEIR approach - Splits Infected population into “reporte and “unreported
- Dynamics statistically combined with observations and SME knowledge
- Parameters updated daily with new data
- Model parameters change with varying social distancing restrictions
- Prediction uncertainty from unconstrained parameters is characterized



FEMA R1-Tool:

Translating Model into Institutional Requirements



Hospitalizations



Beds

Fatality Management

PPE

	Beds Needed for COVID Patients					
week	CT	MA	ME	NH	RI	VT
3/18/2020	72	155	17	12	10	10
3/25/2020	408	859	31	40	43	36
4/1/2020	804	1,658	49	73	96	59
4/8/2020	1,255	2,510	51	84	233	61
4/15/2020	1,562	3,296	47	98	446	50
4/22/2020	1,586	3,615	44	113	563	26
4/29/2020	1,453	3,606	41	129	558	10
5/6/2020	1,061	3,191	38	145	408	4
5/13/2020	657	2,403	35	161	213	2
5/20/2020	369	1,607	33	176	95	1
5/27/2020	196	994	30	189	40	0
6/3/2020	101	587	28	199	17	0
6/10/2020	51	337	25	206	7	0
6/17/2020	26	190	23	209	3	0



	CONVENTIONAL BURN RATES					
	N95s or other respirators					
week	CT	MA	ME	NH	RI	VT
5/6/2020	146,576	471,367	6,025	22,265	53,767	469

	CONTINGENCY BURN RATES					
	N95s or other respirators					
week	CT	MA	ME	NH	RI	VT
5/6/2020	67,569	219,276	2,823	10,515	24,627	211

	CRISIS BURN RATES					
	N95s or other respirators					
week	CT	MA	ME	NH	RI	VT
5/6/2020	12,400	39,703	506	1,862	4,562	40

Moving Forward

Environment Systems and Decisions
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10669-020-09776-x

SHORT COMMUNICATION

Bouncing forward: a resilience approach to dealing with COVID-19 and future systemic shocks

William Hynes[1] · Benjamin Trump[1] · Patrick Love[1] · Igor Linkov[1]

1.) **Recovery and Building Resilience in the Local Economy**

Preserve and Recover from Disruptions to Local Economies

2.) **Household Resilience**

Bolster consumer/household resilience to shock

3.) **Company/Business Resilience**

Prevent Company Bankruptcies, Layoffs, and/or Shutdown While Complying With Pandemic Response Requirements.

Resilience in Venice?

From University of VA web pages

Environ Syst Decis (2014) 34:378–382
DOI 10.1007/s10669-014-9511-8

PERSPECTIVES

Risk and resilience lessons from Venice

Igor Linkov · Cate Fox-Lent · Jeffrey Keisler · Stefano Della Sala · Jorg Sieweke



Civilizational Ups and Downs: Thinking in Systems and Resilience

Journal of Public Health | Vol. 39, No. 2, pp. 254–257 | doi:10.1093/pubmed/fdw044 | Advance Access Publication May 25, 2016

Perspectives

Disease epidemics: lessons for resilience in an increasingly connected world

S.N. DeWitte[1], M.H. Kurth[2], C.R. Allen[3], I. Linkov[2]



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Why Resilience? Diminishing Returns of Risk-Based Approaches



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

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